Clothing the world efficiently: The MFA and consumers by Glismann, Hans H. & Spinanger, Dean
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Glismann, Hans H.; Spinanger, Dean
Working Paper
Clothing the world efficiently: The MFA
and consumers
Kiel Working Papers, No. 208
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Glismann, Hans H.; Spinanger, Dean (1984) : Clothing the world efficiently:
The MFA and consumers, Kiel Working Papers, No. 208, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47077Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers
Working Paper No. 208
Clothing the World Efficiently
- The MFA and Consumers -
Hans H. [Glismann
Dean Spinanger
Institut ftir Wfeltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel
ISSN 0342-0787Kiel Institute of World Economics
Department I
Diisternbrooker Weg 120, 2300 Kiel-1
Working Paper No. 208
Clothing the World Efficiently




The author himself, not the Kiel Institute of
World Economics, is solely responsible for the
contents and distribution of each Kiel Working
Paper.
Since the series involves manuscripts in a pre-
liminary form, interested readers are requested
to direct criticisms and suggestions directly
to the author and to clear any quotations with
him.
ISSN 0342 - 0787- 1 -
"Pass a law to (the) effect (that no) one shall henceforth be
permitted to employ any beams or rafters but such as are produced
and fashioned by blunt hatchets ... Whereas at present we give a
hundred blows, we shall then give three hundred. The work which
we now do in an hour will then require three hours. What a power-
ful encouragement will thus be given to labor? ... Whoever shall
henceforth desire to have a roof to cover him must comply with
our exactions, just as at present whoever desires clothes to his
back must comply with yours" (Frederic Bastiat on proposal of
French Minister of Commerce to raise duty on imported cloth, in:
Heilbronner, p. 154).
The sarcasm of Baetiat almost 150 years ago quite aptly and in
all seriousness covers a fair share of the arguments raised when-
ever foreign industries are more competitive than domestic ones.
Vested interests, ranging from employers and employees to unions
and elected officials, arouse support around the well-known pro-
tectionist arguments, among which the employment issue plays a
central role. Such is the case with the Multifibre Agreement
(MFA), which came into being under the umbrella of GATT, itself
(ironically enough) born out of the recognition of the need to
ensure full employment and a steadily increasing volume of real
income (see GATT Preamble).
In light of-
1 %he increasing sectoral employment problems in many
industrialized,* countries, already struggling with aggregate un-
employment levels'-which have been ratcheting up over the last
decade, and aggregated by the zero-sum world in which we seem to
exist, scapegoats are sought and quickly found - outside the
country of course. That is, employment in MFA industries in de-
veloping countries is sacrified for employment in industrial
countries. Should such reactions not be halted, a new Smoot-Haw-
ley era - this time disguised by doubletalk in the form of "orga-
nized free trade", "voluntary restraints" and "multilateral mutu-
al consensus agreements" - would be just around the corner. It is
Note: The authors would like to thank Juergen B. Donges and
Martin Wolf for helpful comments on an earlier version.
Nonetheless the usual waiver applies.- 2 -
thus of crucial importance - and this is the intention of this
paper - to delineate certain basic employment issues connected
with the ramifications of an agreement like the MFA .
This paper first gives a brief overview of the scope of the pro-
blem; attention is then drawn to certain theoretical and policy-
based incongruences before moving on to some statistical under-
pinnings.
I Background on Trade in Textiles and Clothing
At the crux of the issues which led to the MFA (and its forerun-
2
ners the STA and LTA) lies the simple fact that to a large ex-
tent the textile and clothing industries belong to the classical
import substitution and export expansion industries . It can thus
hardly be surprising that those countries, industrializing in
line with basic neoclassical principles regarding an efficient
economic allocation of resources, should develop labour intensive
lines of production, among which textiles and clothing play an
important role. As it turns out, those developing countries which
capture large shares of the world market for textile and clothing
(see Table 1) contribute to the well known economic success
stories. Others, like India, whose share initially was quite
large, failed to remain competitive even regarding labour inten-
sive lines of production and lost out considerably over the
years. All in all the developing countries were able to more than
double their world market share of manufacturing exports and
exports of clothing over the 16 year period; the share of textile
products in world trade from these countries, however,remained at
roughly the same level. The relatively poor performance of texti-
les is no doubt due to increased domestic production and down-
stream processing in the LDCs. The extent to which the developing
countries shifted the structure of their exports away from texti-
les and between textiles and clothing can be seen in Table 2.
These developments caused trade balances particularly for cloth-
ing of most of the industrialized countries to exhibit sizeable
and even increasing deficits (Table 3) . Accordingly imports from- 3 -
Table 1: Exports of Total Manufactures , Textiles (SITC 65) and Clothing (SITC 84) for Selected

























































aSITC 5 to 8 minus 68 (non-ferrous
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share in manufacturing exports.
Sources: Own calculations based on: UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, recorded years, supple-
" mented by UN Commodity Trade Statistics, UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, UNCTAD Handbook of
International Trade and Development Statistics, GATT, International Trade 1982/83, national trade
statistics, GATT, Study on Textiles and GATT, Network of World Trade by Areas and Commodity
Classes.- 4 -
Table 2: Textiles (SITC 65) and Clothing (SITC 84) Export Shares (%)









































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: GATT International Trade 1982/8 3.- 6 -
developing countries as a percent of apparent consumption moved
upward (Table 4), whereby it can hardly be contended that on the
average the levels reached by 1976/77 were threatening. Pre-World
War II experience to the contrary, more protection was called for
and governments developed a finely tuned apparatus of measures to
ensure that the constituents (entrepreneurs and workers) were
satisfied in the short-run, while preferring not to worry about
the longer term problems. Maybe, however, such an approach was
not only fooling one's self, but actually creating undesirable
expectations among the constituents who assumed that governments
would behave similarly in the future.
While it might be assumed for the most successful of developing
countries, where the industrialization process is rapidly expand-
ing, that structural shifts are more easily swallowed, rapid
interindustry changes in industrialized countries - particularly
when lower economic growth rates allow little room for maneuver-
ing - engenders protection. Thus instead of promoting the process
of disinvestment in "aging industries" in. industrialized coun-
tries, it was slowed down or even reversed (mainly by instituting
subsidies and other non-tariff barriers).
Further complicating the issue was the fact that in many cases
the textile and clothing industries had been able to survive only
by having been relocated to peripheral areas with lower wage/
production costs as well as by employing marginal workers. Fur-
thermore, defensive capital intensive production methods were
introduced, complemented in recent years by the micro-technology
revolution. Nonetheless, all these counter measures did not keep
exports from developing countries from increasing faster than
domestic production in industrial countries.
II The Debate on the Relation Between Protection and Employment
Mainstream economics contends that foreign trade protection dis-
torts prices as well as the national and international allocation
of resources; with protection the social product is said to be
lower than it could be without protection. Nevertheless there are- 7 -






















































































































































































Source; UNCTAD, Supplement I98O Handbook of International Trade and
Development Statistics.- 8 -
always arguments put forward to justify foreign trade protection
of which the following are the most common:
unfair competition or the burden of imports;
too high adjustment costs;
imports rather than domestic parameters determine the level
of employments;
the lack of alternative employment opportunities.
Whereas these arguments are dealt with individually, empirical
evidence - because all these points are interconnected - thrusts
towards the employment and income effects of an international
relocation of MFA industries.
Freedom of choice seems to be an enormously scarce good. If ad-
justments would take place quickly representatives of the cloth-
ing industry or of the respective trade union would not argue
about the burden of unemployment created by "unfair" imports;
they would rather move into other occupations with less burdens
and less unfairness. But the consequences of having such a free
choice - namely the job and locational turnover as well as inse-
curities - are perceived as being too costly. A reason for this
may be seen in the price increasing effects of a protectionist
policy which reduces competitiveness of foreign suppliers, there-
by making it unnecessary for domestic producers and labour to
look for new occupations, at least for the meantime; it rather
pays them to look for arguments which make governments grant
protection. One such argument is that competitors in less devel-
oped countries have an unfair cost advantage because of their
lower wages. How can the German clothing industry compete suc-
cessfully with Hongkong or South Korean suppliers if wages are
ridiculously low in these countries?
The answer obviously is: it cannot. If it could, it would not
invest scarce resources in lobbying activities and would not need
such a high degree of protection. The economic question neverthe-- 9 -
less is whether overall domestic welfare can be increased by a
policy which compensates international wage differentials. On the
average the national wage level - given the capital stock - cor-
responds to the national level of labour productivity, but it is
the sectoral wage level which matters here. Some MFA-industries
exhibit considerably lower productivity than the national aver-
age, but if they are forced to pay average wages and there is
considerable import competition, their existence is severely
endangered. The wages these industries have to pay - to keep
labour from moving out or to satisfy trade unions - are thus too
high to maintain international competitiveness; but at the same
time these wages are too low to give workers an income comparable
with other industries - which may partly explain why the share of
low skilled or female labour is relatively high in MFA indus-
4
tries .
Granting protection to these industries will keep labour and
capital from leaving sectors with inherently low returns. Elimi-
nating foreign competition will not raise the industry's produc-
tivity as measured by world market prices and thus not increase
competitiveness on world markets. Instead a new burden of fore-
gone clothing imports via protection arises which becomes a bur-
den to consumers (who have to pay higher clothing prices), to
unprotected domestic branches including export industries (who
have to live with an overvalued exchange rate) and, last but not
least, to foreign exporters (who have to depreciate past invest-
ments more quickly) and to producers in other clothing importing
countries (who will be subjected to increased competition).
A commonly stated argument is that adjustment costs are too high
and thus imports should be limited. For this to be true, however,
the comparative disadvantages of clothing production must be seen
as being only of short-run significance. In the same vein, but
more on the non-economic side, is the argument that changes in
the structure of production due to comparative disadvantages of
production are too "painful" for all factors of production.- 10 -
According to the first argument international differences in the
costs of production are not lasting - it would not be advisable
to make the structure of domestic production depend on such a
static concept. This is one of the few arguments which may be
refuted on a priori grounds: (1) In case the international factor
price equalization is prevented through protection the causes of
international differences in comparative costs - namely differen-
ces in relative factor prices - will remain; evidence of this may
be found in the continuous decline of the industrial countries'
share of MFA exports (Table 1) despite the MFA. (2) International
trade theory tells us that free trade tends to equalize prices
for identical factors internationally; this does not imply that
comparative advantages are eliminated, but that a further expan-
sion of trade (beyond the status where factor prices are the same
internationally) is not of additional benefit to the partici-
pants.
Whether the costs of adjusting to an increase in clothing imports
must be considered to be too high is basically a question of the
view of the social welfare. It may be mentioned that there are
other causes of changing levels and structures of production
which are often regarded as more important (changes in demand, or
exports, or productivity); it may further be argued that economic
(as well as any other) progress is quite unthinkable without
adjustment (Lorenz, 1980, pp. 35). That is to say every decision
of preventing or of only delaying adjustment is also costly.
Every economic policy aiming at a certain level and structure of
employment restricts structural change and leads to losses in the
social product, static as well as dynamic.
When employment problems are seen as stemming from imports rather
than from domestic parameters, such as wages, the following spe-
cific points are brought forth in connection with textiles and
clothing:
imports are rising too fast (or import shares of specific
countries are rising too fast);- 11 -
production is of a special regional importance because of
its location in economically weak regions;
production has a unique structure of employment which calls
for a certain amount of protection; mostly the high share of
female employment or of low skill employment is mentioned in
this connection;
interregional (or international) mobility of the factors of
production is relatively low;
the increasing divisibility of production processes enhances
the export Of more and more activities, a technical tendency
which should be compensated by an increase in the protection
of remaining activities.
All these arguments stress the point that it is in the interest
of full employment to do something against imports, because they
are considered a prime "cause" of unemployment. First, something
should be said about the old assignment problem. It does not
suffice to demand protection in order to increase (maintain)
employment; it should then be explained what wages are for in
such a scenario. To put it positively: as long as there is a
strong correlation, in theory as well as empirically tested,
between wages and employment, one should look for the real causes
of unemployment instead of trying to attribute unemployment to
imports (too many), exports (too few), productivity (too high) or
demand (too low). Whatever trade policy prevails the hypothesis
has not been refuted that there is a wage rate change for every
tariff increase or for every trade liberalization which ensures
full employment. If trade policy is ready and willing to compen-
sate every wage bargain with respect to the employment issue,
responsibility of trade unions and employer's organizations would
be watered down.
A second point is that if behind the above hypotheses a real
humanitarian concern lies, it can be argued that it is inhumani-
tarian to divide such a concern; i.e. he who raises humanitarian
points should raise them in such a way that they are applicable
on a universal basis. This would imply that the employment ef-ffir Walt'.virtadiaft Kk)
- 12 -
fects at home as well as in those countries whose imports are
hampered should be considered equally and equal. Taking every-
thing into account - including labour intensity of production or
alternative employment possibilities - it may be surmised that
import restrictions through the MFA have higher employment dis-
placement effects in less developed countries than they have a
positive employment effect in industrial countries. In other
words: the MFA supporters have yet to demonstrate positive world
employment effects.
Third, trade deficits in some industries are to be expected as a
consequence of a world in which a national exchange rate is not
determined by sectoral trade balances but rather by pecuniary
relative costs as well as by non-quantifiable aspects embodied in
the economy. Thus, for a given industry the exchange rate may be
either over- or undervalued depending on the industry's competi-
tive position. A policy aimed at balancing sectoral trade flows
would be pure nonsense.
This argument can be refined by introducing linkages among indus-
tries or between imports and exports. A country like the Federal
Republic of Germany is highly competitive internationally regard-
ing investment goods. Part of the export success is due to the
supply of textile and clothing machinery. Reducing demand by
limiting textiles and clothing imports would in the long run
inevitably lead to lower exports of textile and clothing machine-
ry. Taking together the whole complex of textiles, clothing and
linkages may eventually lead to the question why we do not subsi-
dize clothing imports in order to improve employment in the ma-
chinery exporting sector instead of taxing it?
It should, finally, be pointed out that "the main object of eco-
nomic policy is not to cure unemployment: it is to increase the
social dividend. If by curing unemployment that end is accomp-
lished, well and good. If the cure involves measures inimical to
the increase of the dividend its desirability is more dubious"
(L. Robbins, p. 50) .- 13 -
A certain asymmetry has recently been pointed out regarding the
problem of alternative employment in connection with the two
fundamental foreign trade strategies. The protection strategy is,
at least in the short run, aimed at securing certain jobs of a
certain industry in a certain region. The free trade strategy is
more of a benign indeterminacy regarding these certainties .
Whereas the first can well define its (admittedly narrow) accomp-
lishments, the latter rests on very abstract reasoning and is
really unable to make itself understood by, say, an individual
female textile worker, catholic and of old age, with a big fami-
ly, working in Eastern Bavaria.
The harder it is to make the free trade position understood the
more it may be appropriate to rely on a milder form of trade
liberalization. This milder version can be put under the heading
o
of gradual adjustments , in the first round renouncing an in-
crease in protection, then decreasing protection gradually over a
longer period of time. Much of the employment problem will then
be borne noiselessly, by less hiring of new labour and by retire-
ment.
Ill Some Statistical Underpinnings
The arguments based on the claim of unfair competition because of
low wages in LDCs tell only part of the story, as lower levels of
social security and supplementary benefits as well as higher
levels of capital utilization (i.e. lower fixed costs/unit out-
put) ensure that the cost advantages increase (see Tables 5a and
5b)
9.
Knowing that productivity differences between industrialized and
industrializing countries for such processes are minimal, Table 5
underlines how large the cost differences actually are: wage
costs in developing countries are one fifth on an industrialized
country (5a - col. 3). As concerns capital costs/unit output they
are up to three times higher in industrial countries as compared
with those LDCs which have been particularly successful. Keeping
the above information in mind and combining it with data on capi-- 14 -
Table 5a: Average Hourly Earnings (US-$) of Production Workers in Wearing
































Source: U.S. Tariff Commission, "Economic Factors Affecting the Use of
Items 807.CO and 806.30 of the Tariff Schedules of the United
States." Washington, D.C. 1970.


















































Source: Study on Textiles, GATT, 1972, pp. III-3 + III-9.- 15 -
tal costs/job in a MFA affected industry in a country like Germa-
ny (see Table 6), the argument for an international relocation of
such industries is given additional impetus. In reality, however,
it is not a matter of relocating an entire industry, but rather
one where certain production processes are shifted to an LDC.
Such an approach has received attention in recent years e.g.
through the establishment of Free Trade Zones (FTZs), which in
essence allow firms to profit from the comparative advantages of
a given country with only a minimal amount of regulatory inter-
ference. Whatever the case, a given absence or drop in investment
negatively impacting employment in a country like Germany - given
the current parameters - could well be outweighed by a manifold
increase in employment in an LDC.
The question is of course immediately raised about the degree to
which one can be sure that the ensuing unemployed in an indus-
trial country, due to lags, stickiness and lack of information
will actually find their way into adequate jobs. While no 100%
assurance can be given here, the experience in other countries
shows that only a small share of those out of work have extreme
difficulty in finding an appropriate job . As a matter of fact
the sooner adjustments take place the more likely labour will be
able to find suitable jobs, since the older a worker becomes, the
more difficulty he or she has in finding adequate employment.
This leads to the argument about the regional impact of increased
imports of textiles and clothing into industrialized countries;
i.e. since MFA industries are often located in peripheral areas,
where other job opportunities are lacking the burden of adjust-
ment effects is heavily concentrated on these areas. While it can
be shown that such industries are generally located in the less
prosperous areas of the industrial countries, it is equally true
that in LDCs these industries are basically located in the urban
areas taking advantage of the agglomeration economies and access
to foreign markets (see Table 7) . To the extent that protection
in industrial countries keeps such industries from expanding
production in such a way that neither economies of scale can be- 16 -
Table 6: Capital Costs per Job in Selected Industries in Germany:




































































Source: Own calculations of Institute for World Economics.- 17 -
Table 7 - Regional Development Levels and Concentration








































































































parities based on Kravis et al., Real
More Than One Hundred Countries. In:
The Economic Journal, No. 350, June 1978, Vol . 88.
Source: Own calculation based on national statistics.- 18 -
achieved nor extensive linkages and external economies induced,
then a rapid expansion of the income and industrial base is
thwarted. Such an expansion is particularly necessary in those
LDCs where regional development disparities have led to unaccept-
able levels of out-migration from peripheral areas. Since the
increase in income levels allows governments more room to help
provide the necessary preconditions for industrialization in the
peripheral areas and the widening of the industrial base as well
as the development of linkages help engender the process through
which appropriate industries can be spawned in peripheral areas,
this process would increase income levels in the outlying areas
and thus help to counter the flow of migrants into the urban
areas
Given the increased use of footlose, high-technology methods in
industrial countries in setting up alternative businesses in
peripheral areas, without suffering from communication or infor-
mation deficiencies, it should be possible to institute an inter-
facing of trade liberalization in the MFA industries with a phas-
ing-in of new industries in these areas. Perhaps - if structural
rigor mortis is to be overcome - the introduction of some sort of
free activity zone regulation in these regions would bring back
the type of entrepreneur, who in the past often migrated into the
agglomeration areas.
What causes structural rigor mortis in the first place is clearly
connected with the perceived connection between imports and em-
ployment, as protected markets, from which the inefficient profit
at the expense of the efficient, have little need for competi-
tion. It might be added that unemployment is rarely seen as being
caused by endogeneous ineptitudes - such as a wage policy which
has caused wages to exceed the full employment equilibrium long
ago. With such reasoning it is hardly surprising to find argu-
ments which point to productivity increases as a major reason for
jobs being destroyed. Kierzkowsky and Sampson are a case in point
here. After presenting a component breakdown of employment by
domestic demand, labour productivity and net trade (Table 8) ,
they note "that as expected international trade had a generally- 19 -
Table 8: Clothing Industry: Employment Effects of Changes in Demand,























































Source; Kierzkowski and Sampson, p. 49.
Table 9: RCAs for Textile, Clothing, Total Manufactures and Investment Goods
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Source: K. Breithaupt et al. - Tables A 4-7 ff.- 20 -
negative impact on the level of employment in the clothing indus-
try ... In general, however, it is apparent that international
trade did not constitute the major source of labour displacement,
... productivity increases were by far the most important factors
... 76 thousand jobs (were lost) to the net trade while 290 thou-
sand jobs were lost due to productivity changes (p. 49)". The
logical conclusion is obviously to forbid productivity increases
or even reduce productivity to increase employment - Bastiat's
suggestion with blunt axes fits in well here. Under the same cost
conditions this would lead to increased imports unless stopped by
higher tariff battlers. The final result of such adjustment would
be higher prices and a lower level of real income. The more cor-
rect statement to make is that if productivity had not increased
and imports were permitted unrestrained entry, employment would
have fallen even further, or rather been shifted into more pro-
ductive activities, in areas where comparative advantages (which
aren't owned permanently by any one country) still prevailed.
Obviously the precise delineation of activities which correspond
to the comparative advantage of a country is not easy, and at
best can be based on information out of the past. Nonetheless a
certain insight into the relative success or non-success of prod-
ucts - and hence economic activities - can be gained by using the
well-known Revealed Comparative Advantages (RCAs) indicator pro-
12 posed by Balassa
Calculating the RCAs for Germany for three periods it can be seen
from Table 9 that with respect to all developing country group-
ings comparative disadvantage in textiles and clothing prevailed
and even worsened over the time period. Thereby the largest dis-
advantage and change therein is exhibited for clothing - the
industry where physical capital intensity is second lowest in
Germany (lowest: leather manufactures) - and only about one third
the average physical capital intensity of the total manufacturing
industry (see Table 9). For comparison's sake the RCAs have been
included for total manufacture and investment goods. In the lat-
ter case the strong competitive position of Germany is revealed
as well as the rapid improvement in Japan's position. To summar-- 21 -
ize: the picture presented here is an essence the same as the one
presented in connection with the other more general statistics on
clothing and textile trade; namely one in which LDCs performed
exceptionally well in the area of clothing.
As is well known these aggregate statistics cover up a wide
amount of heterogeneity within the individual categories. To
overcome this weakness detailed disaggregation of MFA products
for Germany's and the USA's trade with DCs and LDCs in the years
1965 and 1978 (Table 10) is examined. As expected, both within
SITC 65 and SITC 84 there are products where the LDCs did better
and those where the DCs did better. The success of the LDCs is
particularly impressive within the clothing industry (SITC 84) .
Furthermore, the extent but also the structure of the inroads
made into the USA and Germany differs to some degree. This should
hardly be surprising as one can assume that even between these
two industrialized countries comparative advantages differ. The
main point to be brought out here, is that even if free trade
existed for MFA products any number of them would be intratraded.
Assuming that the implications about the characteristics of the
textile and clothing industry and trade can be accepted, then a
liberalization of MFA trade would - in a country like Germany -
lead to a greater degree of adjustment problems for the clothing
than for the textile industry, whereby of interest in this paper
is the impact on employment. Given the production parameters
(capital intensity, labour productivity) in DCs and LDCs one
would expect MFA liberalization to increase world employment. At
the same time capital outlays in LDCs would fall below what DCs
would have spent, due to lower capital intensities.
An attempt to find at least a partial substantiation of these
assumed interactions was made using data from the MFA industries
in Germany and Malaysia, supposing they would serve as proxies
for DCs and LDCs respectively. The outcome of this scenario is
shown in Table 11 - which is indeed no more than a ballpark esti-
mate of what might happen - clearly shows that for the two coun-
tries together both employment and income gains are highly posi-- 22 -
Table 10a - Development of Disaggregated Textile and Clothing Trade










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own calculations based on U.N. Commodity Trade Statistics.- 23 -
Table 10b - Development of Disaggregated Textile and Clothing Trade
a of USA vis-,-i-vis




















































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own calculations based on U.N. Commodity Trade Statistics.Table 11: Ballpark Estimates of Worldwide Employment and Income Effects of a One Million DM



















































It is assumed that 2/3 of labour find immediate reemployment at wage and productivity levels
comparable to those in their old occupations. -
 b It is assumed that all employees find new
occupations after one year of being unemployed. The costs of unemployment are represented by
yearly income in the old occupation. New income levels (after one year unemployment) are the
same as before. The social rate of interest is assumed to be 10 p.c.
Source: Glismann, Spinanger (1982), p. 108.- 25 -
tive . In the case of textiles, the induced employment in Germa-
ny is almost as large as the amount of employment considered to
have been eliminated; income is considerably higher as labour has
been redirected (and retrained) in more productive areas. -The
impact of relocating the clothing industry induces initial bene-
fits which do not exceed the assumed costs. The result, however,
for Malaysia is so positive that the ensuing increased demands
for products from Germany would no doubt more than eliminate the
initial impact of the relocation. It must also be noted that the
sizeable capital savings achieved in clothing are not met in the
textile industry. This might well be concluded as pointing to the
comparative advantages existing in some areas of textiles in
Germany (as seen in the higher RCA values vis-a-vis clothing and
also in Table 10).
The establishment of new employment possibilities in a given LDC
would tend to be concentrated in agglomeration areas. But those
areas of production which lend themselves to small-scale facili-
ties, or are resource (cultural) intensive would spread into less
developed areas, particularly if it is ensured that nonconventio-
nal input differentials do not hinder such a process. Free trade
(or activity) zones, with relatively good access to the outside
world, would strengthen the benefits reaped by the agglomerated
areas, but their negative impact on the peripheral areas would be
dampened to the extent that linkages are established (for expe-
rience and impact of such zones in Asia see Spinanger (1984)).
Contrary to opposing contentions, such link's are not only pos-
sible, it is in this case quite probable if, for instance, the
textiles produced in the urban areas are transformed into cloth-
ing in the peripheral regions.
It is also important to note that not included in these calcula-
tions are positive influences stemming from lower prices on MFA
products due to a reduction in tariffs, a more efficient alloca-
tion of resources, ensuing economies of scale (not achieved in
the past because of tariff barriers) and a higher utilization of
production facilities. Adding these to the above calculated bene-
fits it hardly seems likely that the negative costs (including- 26 -
others not calculated here) could even some close to outweighing
the benefits.
IV Concluding Remarks
Those "who imagine they can combine a high rate of unemployment
with free trade are living in a fool's paradise" (Cable, 1977).
Economists are startled by a relationship that does not seem to
fit theory: Trade policy seems to be a variable depending on the
rate of economic growth and, perhaps, on the degree of macroeco-
nomic capacity utilization. They would prefer protection (libera-
lization) to be the independent variable as opposed to economic
growth (Hobson, 1916; Balassa, 1978).
The fact that protectionism is so often dependent upon the ups
and downs of the economy, could be changed if the consumers them-
selves were given a larger influence in shaping trade policies.
As it is now, conflicts between consumers' interests - which are
essentially represented by free trade - and other groups' inter-
ests have been systematically solved by increasing protection.
This has been the salient feature of trade policies in general -
and MFA in particular - over the last twenty years. Prior to
this time period (i.e. back to the late 1940 's) trade policy was
very much in favour of consumers. The ideas underlying interna-
tional arrangements like GATT, agreements to lower tariffs and
other trade barriers and the IMF were born even before the guns
had been silenced in World War II. They rested on the hopes of
creating an economically more efficient system, drawing thereby
on the experience made in the Great Depression. It seemed that
people had learned that beggar-my neighbour policies and striving
for autarky can cause severe troubles, not only of economic na-
ture.
As has been pointed out consumers normally do not have a special
interest in foreign trade policies. This is because knowledge is
a scarce good and the gathering of information is not costless.
Economists used to argue that a sustainable equilibrium is achiev-- 27 -
ed when marginal costs equal marginal revenues. In view of the
14 high price of information on trade policies and of the small
benefits for each consumer to be expected from successfully orga-
nizing a free trade lobby and thus improving trade policies,
consumers' neglect of protectionistic measures cannot be surpris-
ing. A different reasoning applies to producers competing with
imports. Their incomes can depend to a large degree on trade
protection. It pays them to try to influence trade policies - be
it through voting patterns or through lobbying. Empirical analy-
ses indeed indicate that there is some evidence on producers
influencing trade policies according to the "adding machine mo-
del" (which says that the number, height or intensity of trade
barriers depend on the number of producers interested in protec-
tion) and to the "interest group model" (which says that organiz-
ed interests matter)
Thus it may be argued that consumers' interest in free trade is
similar to a public good whereas producers' interests in protec-
tion is not: Once free trade is established all consumers (and
incidentally, producers as a whole) are better off. On the other
hand, protection definitely does not make all producers better
off - indeed, discrimination among producers is the very core of
effective protection.
So if free trade is a public good consumers are interested in,
and if the supply of this good is deemed necessary, then there
must be ways to give consumers more weight in the process of
shaping policies without having the costs of "participation"
exceed benefits. Two possible approaches seem worthwhile stress-
ing: the property rights approach and the compensation model.
Property Rights for Consumers: Protection can be looked at an
instrument of redistributing income from consumers and non-pro-
tected sectors to protected sectors. In that respect it is simi-
lar to theft . Theft is normally declared illegal by society;
the same can hardly be achieved regarding certain features of
trade policy, be it because the distributional effects of trade- 28 -
policy are individually less felt or because it does not pay
individually to engage in protection prevention. This situation
could be changed if the freedom to choose or the freedom to buy
from the cheapest source becomes a property right for all
people . When a consumer (importer) can sue the government or
firms on the ground that his right to consume (i.e. import) Chi-
nese T-shirts has been impinged upon, a protectionist policy will
become expensive maybe even very expensive if class action suits
are allowed (i.e. the damage to all consumers is a large multiple
of the damage to one consumer) . The new equilibrium between the
demand for and supply of protection will be at a some point much
18 closer to free trade
The Case for Compensation; Since every protection measure causes
injuries, consumers as well as exporting foreign countries and
downstream producers should be compensated. In the case of ta-
riffs, for instance, those countries instituting the tariffs
could be obliged by GATT rules to transfer tariff revenues to an
international "Protection Compensating Authority" which would
then compensate exporting countries for damages. In case of quota
regulations, a tariff equivalent could be calculated in order to
impute the revenue to be transferred. And if a country subsidizes
domestic production the proper response would not be anti-dumping
19 duties - as GATT proposes - but rather an equal subsidization
of the same production in foreign countries at the expense of the
country initiating the subsidy.
Obviously the (international) compensation and transfer of tariff
revenues (or their equivalent in cases of quantitative restric-
tions) does not directly favour the consumers. However, indirect-
ly the compensating mechanism would make consumers better off due
to the build-in tendency towards free trade. It would also help
to make politicians aware of the damage that protection is in-
flicting and maybe cause them to deal with the problem at the
roots: get rid of protection.
The fact that trade protection is now and then on the agenda of
economic policy although, as in the case of heavy smoking, the- 29 -
positive welfare effects have neither theoretically nor empiri-
cally been proved indicate that there is more to protection than
economists believe. If people believe protection to be a good
thing, then it is a good thing, per definition (Baldwin, 1979) .
Following this, protection is one of the exogenous variables in
the social welfare function, it's first derivative being posi-
tive. It may be argued that this can only be the case if people
are not as educated as they should be, but this is a very tricky
argument. Who knows whether the "educated" voter would be of
another opinion? Educated people may look with a greater interest
to the welfare of their fellowmen, among which are those who seem
to lose their job because of increased imports from less develop-
ed countries. Protection would then be regarded as a means of
accepting social responsibility. Economically more efficient ways
of redistributing income may be considered as inferior to protec-
tion in case direct transfers go hand in hand with increased
bureaucracy or with humiliation of the recipient. But this also
cannot be called paradise, even by a fool.
Remembering that the aim of economic actions, including in parti-
cular economic policies, is to increase income, and knowing that
both free traders and protectionists claim that each of their
(contrary) policies will increase income and employment, what is
the difference between the two? Perhaps one major difference
between the free-traders and the protectionists is simply the
fact that protectionists view the world sectorally or nationally
whereas free-traders tackle the problem from a macroeconomic and
- in this paper - international standpoint. Looking at MFA indus-
tries, hypothetical calculations exhibit that a considerable
increase in world employment in this sector could be achieved by
re-opening artificial economic frontiers; and what is more, even
macroeconomic welfare - as measured by GDP - and macroeconomic
employment is positively influenced by an increase in the inter-
national division of labour regarding the MFA-industries clothing
and textiles.
Taking the reverse of the above observations as an indicator of
the possible outcome of increased protection through the MFA the- 30 -
danger of a vicious circle arises: national economies may move
from an erroneous assignment of economic policies to a worsening
of economic conditions; these - again misinterpreted - result in
more instead of less undue political actions (Mises, 1926, pp.
626) .
Unfortunately, however, the present outlook is a pessimistic one,
and it probably does not help very much outlining the dismal
economic prospects of a protectionist policy. This has been done
so often in the past - indeed, almost as long as economic history
is recorded we find two choruses each singing their own lines and
not listening to the other side's text. Arguments for and against
protection (or government intervention, and the like) have been
freely exchanged but valued little. It is always the "circumstan-
ces", to quote Bert Brecht, rather than insight which produce
STAs, LTAs and MFAs and which explain changes in the intensity of
applying restrictive measures.- 31 -
APPENDIX
Description of SITC-Numbers listed in Table 10
DIVISION 65. TEXTILE YARN, FABRICS, MADE-UP
ARTICLES, N.E.S.'/ AND RELATED PRODUCTS
651 Textile yarn
651.2 Yarn of wool or animal hair (including
wool tops)
651.3 Cotton yarn
651.4 Yarn containing 85% or more by weight of
synthetic fibres, not put up for retail
sale; monofil, strip (artificial straw
and the like)and imitation catgut, of
synthetic fibre materials
651.5 Yarn containing 85% or more by weight of
synthetic fibres, put up for retail sale
651.6 Yarn of discontinuous synthetic fibres, con-
taining less than 85% by weight of such
fibres
651.7 Yarn of regenerated fibres, not put up for
retail sale; monofil, strip (artificial
straw and the like) and imitation catgut,
of regenerated fibre materials
651.8 Yarn of regenerated fibres, put up for retail
sale
652 Cotton fabrics, woven (not including narrow
or special fabrics)
652.1 Cotton fabrics, woven, unbleached, not mer-
cerized
652.2 Cotton fabrics, woven, bleached, mercerized,
dyed, printed or otherwise finished
653 Fabrics, woven, of man-made fibres (not in- :
eluding narrow or special fabrics) 69
653.1 Fabrics, woven, of continuous synthetic tex-
tile materials 70
653.2 Fabrics, woven, containing 85% or more by
weight of discontinuous synthetic fibres
(other than pile and chenille fabrics) 70
653.4 Fabrics, woven, of discontinuous synthetic
fibres, containing less than 85% by weight
of such fibres (other than pile and chenille
fabrics) 70- 32 -
653.5 Fabrics, woven of continuous regenerated tex-
tile materials 71
653.6 Fabrics, woven, containing 85% or more by
weight of discontinuous regenerated fibres
(other than pile and chenille fabrics) 71
653.8 Fabrics, woven, of discontinuous regenerated
fibres, containing less than 85% by weight
of such fibres (other than pile and chenille
fabrics) 71
654 Textile fabrics, woven, other than of cotton or
man-made fibres
654.1 Fabrics, woven, of silk or of waste silk
654.6 Fabrics of glass fibre (including narrow fa-
brics, pile fabrics, tulle,.lace, knitted
or crocheted fabrics, braids and ornamental
trimmings)
655 Knitted or crocheted fabrics (including tubular
knit fabrics, pile fabrics and open-work fabrics)
655.1 Knitted or crocheted fabrics, not elastic nor
rubberized, of synthetic fibres
655.2 Knitted or crocheted fabrics, not elastic nor
rubberized, of fibres other than synthetic
656 Tulle, lace, embroidery, ribbons, trimmings and
other small wares
657 Special textile fabrics and related products
657.2 Bonded fibre fabrics, similar bonded yarn fabrics
and articles of such fabrics, whether or not
impregnated or coated
657.3 Coated or impregnated textile fabrics and products,
n.e.s.
657.4 Elastic fabrics and trimmings (other than knitted
or crocheted goods) consisting of textile mate-
rials combined with rubber threads
657.5 Twine, cordage, ropes and cables, plaited or not
thereof (e.g., fishing nets, ropemakers' wares)
657.6 Hat shapes, hat-forms, hat bodies and hoods
657.7 Wadding, wicks, and textile fabrics and articles
for use in machinery or plant
657.9 Special products of textile materials
658 Made-up articles, wholly or chiefly of textile
materials, n.e.s.
658.1 Sacks and bags, of textile materials, of a kind
used for the packing of goods
658.2 Tarpaulins, sails, awnings, sunblinds, tents and
camping goods of textile fabric- 33 -
659 Floor coverings, etc.
659.1 Linoleum and similar floor coverings
659.2 Carpets, carpeting and rugs, knotted (made up
or not)
DIVISION 84. ARTICLES OF APPAREL AND CLOTHING
ACCESSORIES
841 Apparel excluding fur
842 Outer garments, men's and boys', of textile
fabrics (other than knitted or crocheted
goods) 153
84 3 Outer garments, women's, girls' and infants',
of textile fabrics (other than knitted or
corcheted goods) 153
844 Under garments of textile fabrics (other than
knitted or crocheted goods)
846.5 Corsets, corset-belts, suspender-belts, bras-
siers, braces, suspenders, garters and the
like (including such articles of other than
knitted or crocheted fabric), whether or not
elastic 154
847.1 Clothing accessories, of textile fabrics (other
than knitted or crocheted goods)
847.2 Clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted, n.e.s,
848.1 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, of
leather or of composition leather
848.3 For clothing (not including headgear) and other
articles made of furskins; artificial fur and
articles made thereof
84 8.4 Headgear and fittings therefore, n.e.s.- 34 -
Footnotes
1 For an in-depth analysis see Keesing and Wolf (1980) and Wolf,
Glismann, Pelzman and Spinanger (1984).
2 See UNCTAD (1967) .
3 Although MFA covers both textiles and clothes, the production
processes as well as the international structure of protection
are quite different (Waelbroeck, 1981).
4 Of course the production conditions often allow for a high
share of unskilled labour. This is the reason why imports from
less developed countries are competitive.
5 See F. Richter (1973).
6 Lord Robbins continues: "We know perfectly well that a general
improverishment would make us all work harder. It is yet to be
shown that more work in this sense is in any way desirable".
Ibidem.
7 To understand the free trade position "it is necessary to have
an understanding of general equilibrium economics" (Corden,
1979, p. 8).
8 On the other hand, it may be argued that there is no sense in
stretching adjustment; if rapid changes do occur the best
thing is to let them hit without protection. These views often
come with increasing experience regarding adjustment assist-
ance (Kahn, 1979, pp. 5).
9 The data in Table 5a are of particular interest because they
cover the same type of work done on the same type of goods
within the same firm.
10 For some detailed analysis of adjustment costs see Gilman,
Glenday, Hamilton, Jacobson, Jenkins, Mutti and Bale and Pelz-
man and Martin. Perhaps it is the paper by Mutti and Bale
which aptly covers the position made here.
11 All this would mean that the massive problems foreseen by the
World Bank with respect to the impact of the rural exodus as
well as the financial burden resulting therefrom - for indus-
trial countries as well - would be reduced.
12 The range of this indicator extends from -100 = total compara-
tive disadvantage to +100 = total comparative advantage.
13 For the details of these calculations see Glismann, Spinanger
(1982) .- 35 -
14 The formation of international economic unions - like the
European Community - seems to have increased costs of informa-
tion gathering simply by multiplying output of the bureaucra-
tic system. Keeping track of trade policies regarding MFA
alone is a task even highly specialized and trained voters can
hardly perform.
15 See Caves (1976), Pincus (1975); see also the reports recently
published by the World Bank on the "Political Economy of Pro-
tection" in. the framework of a "Market Penetration Research
Project".
16 See Tullock (1966/67).
17 Principally, consumer rights have already been established in
most countries regarding public procurement. There is no rea-
son to withhold such rights from private consumers. It may
doubted that private consumers will refrain from exercising
their rights to the same extent governments do. It may be
argued that this is the very reason why such rights are still
withheld from private consumers.
18 Even if class action suits are not allowed such a policy would
probably be successful, as no sound government would continue
to violate clearly defined property rights, once the first law
suit was lost.
19 Anti-dumping would not be a proper response because the built-
in dynamics of the anti-dumping argument can lead to an over-
all trade war.- 36 -
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